A “VELVET PRISON” WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS:
THE CONSTRUCTION OF CULTURE IN POST-1989 CHINA
By Keith Goodwin
On June 5, 1989, an unidentified man stood alone in front of a row of
Chinese tanks. The image, captured by a number of photographers at
the scene, was soon scattered throughout Western news reports, which
emphasized the power of the individual to stand up to the brute force
of an oppressive state—a modern version of David and Goliath. The
scene unfolded the day after the Chinese government sent the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) into Beijing to disperse civilians who had been
protesting in and around Tiananmen Square for weeks. Following a
previous failure to disperse the protesters in May, the Chinese govern
ment deployed the PLA with live rounds and tanks and ordered that
the soldiers clear the square by dawn of June 4.1 What ensued was
chaos. Beijing was transformed into a virtual war zone with the PLA
1
“The Tank Man,” directed by Antony Thomas, Frontline, PBS, April 11, 2006.
Available online at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tankman/ (accessed Nov
ember 7, 2009).
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openly firing upon civilians, wounding 7,000 and killing as many as
2,600 people.2
Western democratic nations have often viewed the events that
unfolded in 1989 as the brutal suppression of a democratic uprising
against authoritarian-communist rule. Emphasizing images like the
Goddess of Democracy and placing June 4 in the context of revolutions
that occurred in the Eastern Bloc around the same time, however, tends
to obscure the fact that the protesters in Beijing sought reform, not
revolution.3
In the twenty years since June 4, 1989, China has undergone a
dramatic economic revolution and transformed itself beyond many
people’s wildest expectations. While it is tempting to see China’s post
1989 economic development and the diminishing visibility of the state
as a micromanaging entity as a response to the events in Tiananmen
Square, it is important to recognize that many of the trends that have
surfaced in the past two decades were in motion prior to the 1989 pro
tests. Since taking control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in
1978, Deng Xiaoping had begun a process of “Reform and Opening”
that was designed to bring about economic development and material
prosperity without sacrificing the political status quo.4 Nonetheless,
Deng’s economic reforms—often characterized as “Socialism with Chi
nese Characteristics”—allowed an increasing degree of cultural
freedom, particularly after his 1992 “Southern Tour.” Thus, June 4 is
best viewed not as a transformative event in the modernization of
China, but as a consequence of tensions inherent in a policy that sought
dramatic economic development without the chaos of Mao’s Cultural
Revolution or a challenge to traditional party authority. This tension
continues today.
2
“The Tank Man”; Nicholas D. Kristof, “Beijing Death Toll at Least 300; Army
Tightens Control of City but Angry Resistance Goes On,” The New York Times, June 5,
1989.
3
Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, “Tiananmen’s Shifting Legacy,” in China in 2008: A Year
of Great Significance, ed. Kate Merkel-Hess, Kenneth L. Pomeranz, and Jeffrey N.
Wasserstrom, 135-140 (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2009), 135.
4
Liu Kang, Globalization and Cultural Trends in China (Honolulu: University of
Hawaii Press, 2004), 1.

2

Keith Goodwin

This essay aims to analyze the construction of “Chinese” culture
since 1989. Although the events of June 4 will be important to this
endeavor, this essay does not intend to illustrate the specific contribu
tions of the Tiananmen Square protests to China’s post-1989 cultural
development. Instead, this essay looks at the “delicate dance” that has
occurred in the last two decades of Chinese history as traditional party
rhetoric and government influence have confronted an increasingly
pluralistic cultural environment. This is not to say that the previous
twenty years have been marked by a simple state-versus-individual
conflict. On the contrary, the construction of culture and national
identity in post-1989 China has been highly complex and has been the
consequence of conflict and interaction between the state, society, and
the market economy.
Certainly the hegemonic influence of the state has played a signifi
cant role in defining the limits of the interactions and discourses during
this period, but just as the state has sought to impose a coherent cultural
identity on members of the Chinese community, groups, individuals,
and market forces have similarly affected the development of the state.
By examining various trends since 1989, I hope illuminate the ways in
which this fluid, and often reciprocal, process of cultural construction
has been manifested and demonstrate how it has often undermined the
state’s dominance in the realm of culture.
CHINA’S “VELVET PRISON”:
THE RECONSTRUCTION OF STATE HEGEMONY
Although I ultimately argue that the state does not possess a monopoly
on culture in post-1989 China, this is not to say that the Chinese gov
ernment is no longer a dominant player in the process of cultural
construction. In fact, the hegemonic power of the state has simply
evolved into a more subtle form since 1989. Geremie Barmé’s In the
Red: On Contemporary Chinese Culture provides a useful line of analysis
for understanding this process by applying the work of Hungarian
writer Miklós Haraszti—author of The Velvet Prison: Artists Under
State Socialism—to contemporary China. Like post-Stalin Eastern
Europe, Barmé argues, the state in post-Mao China has tried to
3
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reformulate the social contract such that “consensus replaces coercion
and complicity subverts criticism.”5 In other words, the state has tried
to co-opt individuals into a “progressive censorship” that effectively
makes them a part of the state rather than a voice of opposition.
While The Velvet Prison focuses specifically on artists, it is equally
useful to an understanding of the evolution of society and culture in
contemporary China. According to Haraszti, “the velvet prison” is a
world in which “[state meddling in the arts] is no longer used to silence
opposition to the state but to ensure that intellectuals will more effec
tively perform their proper role.”6 Consequently, “heavy-handed
methods of the past are pressed into service only when the new ones fail
to function properly.”7 China’s velvet prison thus seems to have its ori
gins in the reforms undertaken following Deng Xiaoping’s rise to power
in 1978. However, as Barmé has noted, Chinese cultural policies in the
1980s were still characterized by a tension between “hard” and “soft”
power approaches, as artists and individuals were co-opted into state
tutelage but were purged—or even violently repressed—when they
stepped outside of tacit boundaries.8 While Haraszti acknowledges that
this alternation of hard and soft power existed in Eastern Europe,
China’s hard power continues to manifest itself—albeit in more minor
forms—well into the post-Mao period. Chinese society has not been
fully coerced into progressive censorship.
China’s velvet prison does not, therefore, fully conform to
Haraszti’s model. The events of June 4 and, more recently, the govern
ment crackdown against Falun Gong, serve as important reminders that
the state has not fully exchanged “sticks” for “carrots.” Generally speak
ing, however, the past twenty years of Chinese history have not been
characterized by the widespread use of brute force to keep the masses in
order. In fact, the state has, in many cases, succeeded in co-opting
5
Geremie R. Barmé, In the Red: On Contemporary Chinese Culture (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1999), 7.
6
Miklós Haraszti, The Velvet Prison: Artists Under State Socialism, trans. Katalin
and Stephen Landesmann (New York: Basic Books, 1987), 7.
7
Ibid.
8
Barmé, In the Red, 8-9.
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individual desires by “offering responsibility and a constructive role to
those people of quality hungry for power.”9
Where China also differs from the model described by Haraszti is
in the presence of a market economy. Like the “directed culture” of
state socialism, a market economy also creates limitations:
[An employee’s] human rights are severely circumscribed—
except, of course, his right to work. He cannot go outside the
walls, he cannot wander at will around the factory, cannot say,
or write, or organize whatever he wants. In these matters, it is
the firm’s interests, conveyed by its owners and managers, that
determine right and wrong within the corporate culture…
How is this (admittedly simplified) state of affairs different
from state socialism? Only one aspect is truly different: the
existence of other companies.10
With China’s reforms and the growth of private corporations subject to
market forces and demand, Chinese society is now subject to both the
impositions of state ideology and the ideology of commerce—a tension
made more dynamic by the state’s influence in the market economy.
Because of this relationship, state hegemony in post-1989 China might
best be conceptualized as a “velvet prison with Chinese characteristics.”
Directed Culture: Patriotic Education and National Humiliation
Although having origins prior to 1989, the structure of China’s velvet
prison was greatly shaped by the Tiananmen Square protests. Respond
ing to the “June 4 Incident,” the CCP undertook a campaign of
“cultural rectification.” The chaos of June 4 and the events that had
unfolded in Eastern Europe throughout 1989 led the Party to conclude
that the abandonment of Mao’s legacy “was nothing less than political
suicide.”11 Hence, “to renew official ideology and build broad-based
national support for the Communist regime” became a central concern
9

Haraszti, 26.
Ibid., 65-66. Parentheses original.
11
Liu, 55.
10
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for the state in the aftermath of Tiananmen.12 Within the Party, how
ever, there was disagreement over how to best reformulate and reassert
its ideological influence. On one hand, “conservatives” saw the events of
1989 as a confirmation of their belief that unchecked intellectual
liberalization would undermine government authority.13 They sup
ported a Neo-Maoist ideology that criticized Deng Xiaoping’s market
reforms.
Unwilling to sacrifice the goal of economic prosperity, the Party’s
“reformist” wing aimed to develop a new, cohesive ideology to unify the
Chinese populace.14 What resulted was an ideology that, while not al
ways consistent with the “revolutionary hegemony” that had long
formed the backbone of the state, “retained the discursive formations,
the formal and rhetorical features, of Mao’s ideology,” and wrapped the
Party in the cloak of nationalism.15 Such an evolution resembles Karl
Marx’s argument in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.
According to Marx, the present was continually infused with the
traditions of history. Even revolutionaries, he claimed, attempted to
glorify their aims in the language of previous generations. Likewise, the
transformation of state hegemony in post-1989 China acted to “conjure
up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them names,
battle cries and costumes in order to present the new scene of world
history.”16
Epitomizing the government response to the ideological decay of
the 1980s—particularly the political unrest of June 4, 1989—was a
state-led campaign of “patriotic education.” However, rather than as
sume the form of overt indoctrination, the campaign to instill Chinese
patriotism subtly institutionalized state ideology. This is evidenced by
the fact that the educational reforms of the 1990s no longer made the
12
Suisheng Zhao, “A State-Led Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in
Post-Tiananmen China,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 31, no. 3 (1998): 289.
13
Kalpana Misra, “Curing the Sickness and Saving the Party: Neo-Maoism and
Neo-Conservatism in the 1990s,” in Chinese Political Culture 1989-2000, ed. Shiping
Hua, 133-160 (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), 134.
14
Ibid.
15
Liu, 55; Zhao, 289.
16
Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (New York: Interna
tional Publishers, 1963), 15-16.
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Marxist political science exam a requirement for all college applicants in
China. Instead, the state initiated programs like the “I am Chinese”
program in universities and a curriculum in all schools that would “por
tray the Communist state as the embodiment of the nation’s will” and
“reassert the moral authority of the party.”17
It would be a mistake, however, to say that the patriotic education
campaign was purely institutional. Rather, it was a national project that
sought to move beyond the “empty slogans” of previous decades and
foster a general sense of patriotism that identified the Chinese state
with the CCP. 18 In fact, the campaign epitomized 1990s government
propaganda in the sense that reforms that were not strictly consistent
with Maoist dogma nonetheless sought legitimacy via appeals to Maoist
rhetoric. By doing so, the state was able to garner support from those
for whom Maoism was a fundamental historical legacy and incorporate
those who, while born into the system, lacked such concrete experience.
That the 1990s was also a decade in which the state undertook a dra
matic reinvention and restaging of the revolutionary “Red Classics”
attests to the fact that the patriotic education campaign was part of a
larger movement to rectify a mass culture in support of the CCP. 19
The reconstruction of state hegemony under the umbrella of patri
otism also found much success by drawing upon the narrative of
“national humiliation.” Prevalent throughout the history of post-Qing
China, the discourse of national humiliation “recounts how at the
hands of foreign invaders and corrupt Chinese regimes, sovereignty was
lost, territory dismembered, and the Chinese people thus humiliated.”20
State portrayals of the events of June 4 were frequently framed by this
discourse. Liu Baiyu, a senior party novelist, for example, described the
political unrest as a consequence of the “wholesale adoption of Western
bourgeois values.”21 Through this rhetoric, the state not only under
17

Zhao, 291-293.
Ibid., 298-299.
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Liu, 92-93.
20
William A. Callahan, “History, Identity, and Security: Producing and Consum
ing Nationalism in China,” Critical Asian Studies 38, no. 2 (2006): 180.
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mined charges that posited inherent flaws in the existing governmental
structure, but also legitimized itself by using a language that had, by all
means, become enmeshed in Chinese culture. In fact, through much of
the twentieth century, the discourse of national humiliation had been
used to construct a China that needed “saving” and to legitimize rule
under Mao and the CCP. 22 As Barmé has observed, “While Deng is
admired for what he has done for the economy, Mao is revered, among
other things, for keeping the superpowers, the United States and Soviet
Union, at bay.”23
National humiliation discourse underwent a revival in the 1990s
and formed an integral component to the state-led campaign to redirect
domestic energies toward a CCP-legitimizing patriotism. This is not
only evidenced by the patriotic education campaign’s emphasis on the
study of Chinese history—especially its modern history of imperial
invasion—and its incompatibility with Western democratic ideals, but
also by the reemergence of textbooks linking political unrest to national
humiliation.24 For example, one government textbook read, “Today we
are confronted with foreign and domestic enemies who are plotting to
force ‘peaceful evolution’ on our country.”25 These new textbooks were
the first of their kind to appear in China since 1947 and were comple
mented by an array of publications throughout the 1990s that
continually invoked national humiliation.26 By 2001, the discourse of
national humiliation would be institutionalized by the state-declared
“National Defense Education Day,” which, unlike the previous dis
course of national humiliation that promoted the need for a new
nationalism, acted to reinforce “proved actions and feelings” in support
of the CCP. 27
22

Callahan, 183.
Geremie R. Barmé, “To Screw Foreigners is Patriotic: China’s Avant-Garde Na
tionalists,” The China Journal 34 (1995): 213-214.
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In many ways, post-1989 state policy was effective in fostering a
Chinese nationalism that was both fervent and directed outward in the
form of negative perceptions of the West. The belief that China’s
failure to secure the 2000 Olympic Games resulted from Western—
particularly American—bullying stands as one early example in the
1990s.28 While it is true that the awarding of the 2000 Olympic Games
to Sydney was tainted by bribery charges,29 the assertion of an antiChina conspiracy seems firmly rooted in the discourse of national hu
miliation. Similarly, the television drama A Beijinger in New York and
the publication of books such as China Can Say No and The Plot to
Demonize China indicate the growing presence of fervent nationalistic
sentiment and the incorporation of Party rhetoric into elements of
popular culture during the mid-1990s. This is not to say that individu
als were wholly co-opted into the state’s ideology, but the appearance of
such works indicates that the discourse of state ideology was pervasive.
The revival of national humiliation discourse was also evident during
the recent celebration of the PRC’s 60th anniversary, where usersubmitted comments on the People’s Daily website boasted, “Proud to
be Chinese! Never again will China be humiliated by foreign powers!
China and Taiwan united will never be defeated!”30
The influence of the state on the expression of Chinese
nationalism was, perhaps, most visible in the reactions to NATO’s
1999 bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. In “Tears of Rage:
Chinese Nationalist Reactions to the Belgrade Embassy Bombing,”
Peter Hays Gries presents a number of letters that emerged in Chinese
28
Peter Hessler, Oracle Bones: A Journey Between China’s Past and Present (New
York: HarperCollins, 2006), 265; Edward Friedman, “Still Building the Nation: The
Causes and Consequences of China’s Patriotic Fervor,” in Chinese Political Culture,
1989-2000, 103-132 (see note 13), 125.
29
“Olympics—Did $70,000 in Pledges Buy Votes for Sydney?” The Seattle Times,
January 23, 1999, http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19990
123&slug=2940183 (accessed November 15, 2009).
30
“Blessings to the Motherland,” postings on the People’s Daily website, 60th Anni
versary of the Founding of the PRC, http://english.people.com.cn/90002/
97623/index.html (accessed November 27, 2009). PRC refers to the People’s Republic of
China, the government of mainland China which claims to have authority over the island
of Taiwan, known formally as The Republic of China on Taiwan.
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newspapers following the Belgrade bombing to argue that the
outpouring of passionate—if not angry—nationalistic and patriotic
sentiments in the aftermath of the bombing should be viewed as
“genuine and understandable” rather than as byproducts of
government-sponsored propaganda.31 However, while the emotion may
have been genuine—and justifiable—the language utilized to express
this emotion reflected the state-led patriotic education campaign and
the revival of national humiliation discourse.
An article that appeared in the People’s Daily, for instance, was
clearly framed by the discourse of national humiliation in its emphasis
of the continued strength of China in the face of Western aggression:
The wheel of history will not go backward. This is 1999, not
1899. This is not…the age when people can barge about the
world in gunboats…It is not the age when the Western powers
plundered the Imperial Palace at will, destroyed the Old Sum
mer Palace, and seized Hong Kong and Macao…China is a
China that has stood up; it is a China that defeated the Japa
nese fascists; it is a China that had a trial of strength and won
victory over the United States on the Korean battleground.
The Chinese people are not to be bullied, and China's sover
eignty and dignity are not to be violated…US-led NATO had
better remember this.32
Other authors similarly expressed anger over U.S. attempts to humiliate
China and argued for China to reassert its sovereignty and take action
against the U.S.33 While some might contend that the act of Chinese
citizens demanding that the state exact an aggressive response is indica
tive of a “bottom-up” response, these demands nonetheless act to
reinforce the notion of the Party as the “national will.”
31
Peter Hays Gries, “Tears of Rage: Chinese Nationalist Reactions to the Belgrade
Embassy Bombing,” The China Journal 46 ( July 2001): 26.
32
Han Zhongkun, “Zhongguo, bushi yibajiujiu [This is Not 1899 China],” People’s
Daily, May 12, 1999, translated and quoted in Gries, “Tears of Rage,” 32.
33
Gries, “Tears of Rage,” 33, 37-40.
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The presence of anti-Western patriotism underscored by the
discourse of national humiliation is also evident in Peter Hessler’s
firsthand account in Oracle Bones, which describes protesters shouting
“Down with American imperialism!” and directing their anger at local
American businesses like McDonald’s.34 Hessler also recounts conversa
tions with local Chinese who rebuked the United States’ perception of
itself as a world police power and occasionally brought up the legacy of
the Opium War in the midst of venting their anger.35
Thus, the reconstruction of state hegemony in the 1990s—what I
call a velvet prison with Chinese characteristics—was fundamentally
underscored by the ideology of patriotism and national humiliation.
Just as Haraszti argues that socialist governments in Eastern Europe
utilized “relics” to present themselves as the guardians of tradition,36 the
CCP has also sought to exercise a monopoly on patriotism in order to
direct such sentiment toward state legitimization and the support of
Party authority. As seen in incidents like the Belgrade bombing, this
policy had a significant impact on public discourse and the shaping of
post-1989 culture. However, by invoking the ambiguous ideology of
patriotism, the state also created a considerable “gray” area for cultural
discourse—one that, by allowing a certain degree of tolerance for dissi
dents, also allowed individuals to transform the state and, therefore, to
challenge the state’s attempt to exercise a monopoly on Chinese culture.
THE PRAGMATIC SHIFT:
PUBLIC DISCOURSE WITHIN THE VELVET PRISON
Although the state has acted to reinvent and reassert its hegemonic
position, it does not possess a monopoly on cultural construction in
post-1989 China. In part, this stems from the nature of the ideology of
patriotism, which, as an ambiguous concept, has created a considerable
“gray” area for public discourse. While the state has sometimes acted to
visibly define the scope of patriotism through the use of force, events in
post-1989 China tend to indicate that so long as China’s leaders or the
34

Hessler, 14-17.
Ibid., 22.
36
Haraszti, 111.
35
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authority of the Chinese Communist Party are not publicly attacked,
all sorts of discourses are tolerated.37
In The Velvet Prison, Haraszti argues that although state socialism
prescribes certain rules, the artist is not inherently constrained: “In our
eyes the state represents not a monolithic body of rules but rather a live
network of lobbies. We play with it, we know how to use it, and we
have allies and enemies at the controls.”38 Likewise, post-1989 Chinese
society has also been characterized by discourses articulated in the
framework of state ideology. By doing so, individuals in China have
been able to exact change on the state itself. Although changes may be
minor and incremental, they nonetheless undermine the state’s attempt
to exercise a monopoly on culture.
There are a number of reasons for the transition to a more “prag
matic dissent” in post-1989 China. A general fear of chaos and disorder
seems particularly important. While many have written about the
Party’s desire to avoid a return to the disorder of the Cultural Revolu
tion or Tiananmen protests, few have acknowledged that the general
population also has a vested interest in national stability. Chinese stu
dents, for example, became increasingly involved in the Party and less
likely to voice idealistic opposition to state policy after the June 4
protests as self-interest and career advancement became predominant
factors.39 Likewise, economic reform has left many individuals less
willing to sacrifice the stability of the state, which is often viewed as an
important source of material gain.40
Despite being less visible, this pragmatic approach has created pro
found developments in contemporary Chinese culture. By exploring
three particular events—the publication of China Can Say No, the
development of “cultural t-shirts,” and the “nail house” resistance to
37

Liu, 57, 73.
Haraszti, 78-79.
39
Luo Xu, “Farewell to Idealism: Mapping China’s University Students of the
1990s,” Journal of Contemporary China 13, no. 41 (November 2004): 783-785.
40
Bruce J. Dickson, “Dilemmas of Party Adaptation: The CCP’s Strategies for
Survival,” in State and Society in 21st-Century China: Crisis, Contention, and Legitimation,
ed. Peter Hays Gries and Stanley Rosen, 141-158 (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004),
144.
38
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government redevelopment—I hope to show how public discourse has
operated within China’s velvet prison to counter the state’s attempts to
monopolize Chinese culture.
China Can Say No: Directing Nationalism at the Party
Published in 1996, China Can Say No criticized Western—particularly
U.S.—influence in China and became a major commercial success. De
scribed by Newsweek as “a shrill anti-U.S. polemic,”41 the book was
initially supported by the Chinese government as a genuine reflection
of public opinion.42 Indeed, China Can Say No was so successful that it
spurred a whole wave of “say no” literature that echoed the growing
anti-American nationalism emerging in the 1990s. Actively trying to
co-opt the discourse into the framework of pro-Party ideology, the state
often confined negative reviews of such “say no” literature abroad to
places like Hong Kong and Taiwan.43
Yet, despite seeming to reflect the state’s patriotic and national
humiliation rhetoric, China Can Say No undermined the government
monopoly on nationalistic discourse. By projecting themselves as the
embodiment of popular opinion and making claims that, essentially,
made demands of the state, the authors of China Can Say No and other
“say no” literature challenged the traditional dominance of the Party.
Ben Xu remarks, “While [popular nationalists] direct their attack
explicitly against foreigners, the present government is held implicitly
to account for yielding too readily to foreign political and commercial
demands and for surrendering China’s national dignity in the proc
ess.”44 It was this aspect of the “say no” literature that ultimately re
sulted in an about-face by the state, which openly criticized China Can
41
George Wehfritz, “Banned in Beijing: The Masses Love Pulp Fiction. Officials
Don’t,” Newsweek, October 28, 1996, http://www.newsweek.com/id/103151 (accessed
November 24, 2009).
42
Peter Hays Gries, “Popular Nationalism and State Legitimation,” in State and
Society in 21st-Century China: Crisis, Contention, and Legitimation, 180-194 (see note
40), 186.
43
Ibid. 187.
44
Ben Xu, “Chinese Populist Nationalism: Its Intellectual Politics and Moral Di
lemma,” Representations 76 (Autumn 2001): 133.
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Say No in December 1996, cracked down on the proliferation of “say
no” literature, and banned the book’s sequel, China Can Still Say No.45
Although the state ultimately suppressed the “say no” craze, these
works still influenced the state’s development. Attempting to buttress
its position as the embodiment of the nation’s will, government efforts
to co-opt the expression of popular nationalism simultaneously re
quired the state to infuse itself with “nonofficial discourse.” After
reversing its position on China Can Say No, for example, the Party
sought “to persuade the people to let the Party maintain its leading role
in Chinese nationalism and foreign policy-making.”46 The publication
of China Should Not Play ‘Mr. No’, for instance, praised the “righteous
anger” of popular nationalists while also claiming that “emotion cannot
substitute for policy.”47 While proclaiming the ultimate authority of the
state, the response’s legitimization of popular nationalism also under
mined the government’s claim to a monopoly on cultural
construction—although citizens could not make policy, they could
enter the debate of nationalism and exert pressure on the state.
“Cultural T-shirts”: Wearing the Nonofficial
Predating the “say no” craze, the appearance of so-called “cultural tshirts” in Beijing in the early 1990s demonstrates the ability of “dissi
dent” discourses to affect the state. The cultural t-shirts that appeared
in 1991 were largely the work of entrepreneur-artist Kong Yongqian.
Although he insisted that his widely successful t-shirt designs were not
intended to be politically provocative, Kong’s shirts, in effect, used
“nonofficial colloquial language to communicate sentiments that many
people shared but were unable to give voice to in public.”48 In this re
gard, Kong’s shirts were an undeniably populist and nationalistic
project.
In June of 1991, Kong was detained for questioning by the Chi
nese police, who told him that his shirts were the most serious political
45

Gries, “Popular Nationalism and State Legitimation,” 188.
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47
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incident in Beijing since June 4, 1989.49 His shirts were subsequently
banned and his unsold merchandise was confiscated and destroyed. Yet,
in the face of government opposition, Kong defended his shirts with
patriotic language, arguing that he was simply trying to create an
inexpensive product that reflected Beijing sentiments rather than those
of Hong Kong, Taiwan, or the United States.50
However, Kong’s t-shirts still possessed a populist element that
profoundly threatened the state. According to Geremie Barmé:
The shirts would also provide people with an opportunity to
release pent-up emotions and frustrations, regardless of
whether they were personal, social, or political. It was this
dimension of the t-shirt craze—that of a popular, unspoken
conspiracy of self-expression writ in large in satirical and
ironic terms—that the authorities may well have found
unsettling.51
As a “passive” mode of expression, Kong’s shirts allowed people to vent
their opinions in a safe, non-confrontational manner that made it diffi
cult for government authorities to silence. Moreover, by informalizing
individual expression and allowing individuals to have control over
nationalistic expression—in ways that often satirized official state
rhetoric—Kong’s shirts significantly undermined the Party’s control
over national identity discourse and weakened its ability to impose an
ordered, cohesive national identity.
From the state’s perspective, Kong’s t-shirt designs were not only a
challenge to state authority, but were also harmful to socialist morality.
While detained, Kong’s interrogators scrutinized every detail of his
designs, whether it was imagery that, they felt, projected the state as evil
or his orientation of a particular Chinese character that they believed to
be a reference to the Cultural Revolution.52
49
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Fig. 1: “Making Ends Meet.” A T-shirt design by Kong Yongqian. (Photograph by Lois
Conner, from Geremie R. Barmé, In the Red: On Contemporary Chinese Culture. New
York: Columbia University Press, 1999 [Photo Insert].)

The t-shirt “Making Ends Meet,” which featured a large pocket
containing documents such as a monthly bus pass, cloth and grain ra
tions, meal tickets, a name card, and a secret bank account record, was
of particular concern to the police, who accused Kong of being an anti
government activist. Suspicious of his inclusion of outdated govern
ment documents, many of which dated from the Mao period, the police
chided, “You’re resentful of the government’s long-term policies, aren’t
you?…Why do you despise the socialist system so much?”53 While Kong
defended his design and the inclusion of such outdated documents as an
act of nostalgia, his work can nonetheless be seen as subversive for
recalling images of China’s more austere past during a period in which
the state preferred to emphasize the population’s dramatic material
gain. In a similar manner, other t-shirt designs also subverted
government ideology by borrowing commonly used government catch
53

Kong Yongqian, unpublished manuscript, translated and quoted in Barmé, In the
Red, 162.
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phrases—often satirizing official responses to the June 4 protests in the
process—and by highlighting elements of Chinese society that officials
often denied or preferred to ignore.
Kong’s shirts were eventually removed from the market, but,
curiously, he was released from detainment after paying a small fine—a
seemingly minor punishment for what the police had called the most
serious political incident since the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests.
Meanwhile, similar, though less provocative shirts remained on the
market. In fact, the government even tried to co-opt the t-shirt craze in
support of its bid for the 2000 Summer Olympics. However, the
“barbed cynicism” still persisted in these cultural t-shirts and thus
gradually became enmeshed within mainstream culture. While the
“dissidence” may have been scaled back, these shirts nonetheless weak
ened state control on cultural construction and forced the state to ac
commodate exhibitions of individuality that had emerged outside of
official culture.
“I Have a Responsibility to Protect this Place”:
Challenging China’s “Urban Renewal”
Urbanization and “urban renewal” have been defining features of
China’s road to “modernization” as the state has sought to remove “im
pediments to progress” and transform China “from a backward
agricultural country” into an advanced industrial nation.54 In the years
leading up to the 2008 Summer Olympics, Western media became
fascinated by the wave of redevelopment sweeping across China. Images
such as the Chongqing “nail house” were depicted as embodying “the
discontent of people who are suddenly uprooted, told that they must
make way for a new skyscraper or golf course or industrial zone.”55 In
fact, The New York Times found the Chongqing nail house unusual for
the reason that the owners were able to “hold out” for so long in a
54
Hessler, 179; “Urbanization Makes Life Better,” People’s Daily, August 27, 2009,
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90780/91342/6741524.html (accessed November
28, 2009).
55
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Fig. 2: A “Nail House” in China’s Chongqing Municipality. (Photograph by China
Photos/Getty Images, from Howard W. French, “Homeowner Stares Down Wreckers, at
Least for a While,” The New York Times, March 27, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/27/world/asia/27china.html [accessed November
25, 2009].)

country where many were arrested or even beaten for protesting
eviction from their homes.56
However, what is most intriguing is not that they resisted so visi
bly, but how they framed their resistance. When asked about her
resistance by the China Daily, owner Wu Ping boldly stated, “I wanted
to safeguard my dignity and lawful rights.”57 Coupled with the fact that
the owners waved the PRC flag atop their home, the struggle emerged
as a form of patriotism. The owners projected themselves not as oppo
nents of the state, but as fighting to uphold the integrity of the state by
using the law to obtain adequate compensation for a house that had
been passed down through generations.
Peter Hessler provides a similar example in his profiling of Zhao
Jingxin’s struggle to resist the demolition of his home in an old hutong
neighborhood. Like the owners of the “nail house,” Zhao justified his
resistance in patriotic rhetoric, exclaiming, “This house is older than the
56
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United States of America!”58 It was not a matter of money, Zhao ex
plained to Hessler, “As a Chinese person, I have a responsibility to
protect this place. I won’t leave willingly.”59
Zhao’s suit against the government was one of many that occurred
in the late 1990s. According to Hessler, successful suits received promi
nent coverage as a sign of government fairness. However, most failed
and were never heard about in the public sphere.60 Irrespective of the
inconsistent government response, the fact that citizens were able to use
state rhetoric to question the government for the sake of their own
personal interest represents a challenge to the state’s control over patri
otic and cultural discourse. Not only must the state co-opt discontent
through material reward (e.g., a new apartment and lofty financial
compensation), but the state must also respond to challenges that de
mand that it to exemplify the rhetoric it has propagated to fortify its
own legitimacy. That the proliferation of “nail house” protests spurred
the passage of a new property law in 2007 indicates the extent to which
the individual’s use of state rhetoric against the state has forced the
Party to make incremental changes in order to maintain its hegemonic
position.61
CULTURE COMMERCIALIZED: FORCES OF A MARKET ECONOMY
Of the major trends in post-1989 China, the emergence of a vibrant
market economy has been among the most visible and profound. While
Deng Xiaoping tried to downplay the ideological contradictions of
creating a quasi-capitalist system in a socialist state, the introduction of
a market economy nevertheless exerts new forces on China that act on
both the state and society.
Liu Kang has described popular commercial culture in China as a
“new battleground” of culture and ideology wherein battles are waged
58
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through “symbolic acts.”62 Similarly, Arif Dirlik has pointed out that
China’s economic reforms have “changed life at the everyday level in
transforming the habits of consumption—of culture no less than the
commodities of everyday life.”63
In addition, economic reform has significantly altered the ways in
which citizens interact with the government. The state’s pragmatic
approach towards economic development—which has, by all means,
become a form of performative legitimacy—has allowed a considerable
degree of freedom that influences not only the state-society relation
ship, but also the ways in which traditional state ideology is received. As
Liu argues, “Political demystification and economic decentralization
have drastically reduced the authority of the CCP leadership…[state
ideology] is reduced to nothing more than political rhetoric in an in
creasingly pluralistic society.”64
Yet, state influence still pervades commercial culture. The success
of foreign corporations in China, for example, has simultaneously pro
duced both “Westernization” and resistance. Reflecting the post-1989
nationalistic fervor, many Chinese have sought to develop competing
brands and enterprises that more accurately reflect the “Chineseness” of
economic reform.65 In this regard, the forces of the market economy
have become enmeshed into the construction of cultural identity and
may come into conflict with the ideology of state-led patriotism and
fears of renewed national humiliation.
Symbolic Battles: Ideology and Advertisement
A significant result of China’s market reforms has been the growth of
private advertising. While advertising is often a manipulative act, Barmé
has observed that in China, “[targeted advertising] was a marked con
trast to the previous ways in which people were targeted”—commercial
culture created a sense of “consumer empowerment” in which the
62

Liu, 84.
Arif Dirlik, “Markets, Culture, and Power: The Making of a ‘Second Cultural
Revolution’ China,” Asian Studies Review 25, no. 1 (March 2001): 1.
64
Liu, 57.
65
Beverly Hooper, “Globalisation and Resistance in Post-Mao China: The Case of
Foreign Consumer Products,” Asian Studies Review 24, no. 4 (December 2000): 450-453.
63

20

Keith Goodwin

consumers felt less like a product of state propaganda and more like an
individual being catered to.66 However, consumer culture in China was
neither a byproduct of propaganda nor a triumph of individualistic
market forces. Instead, it became a realm of hybridized culture in which
state rhetoric was present but often refashioned for the purposes of
material gain.
While market reforms diminished the role of the state in the econ
omy, the state has not remained neutral. In fact, it has often acted to
funnel commercial culture into areas that reinforce state objectives. Jing
Wang, for example, argues that “weekend culture in China is first and
foremost an official discourse born from well-calculated state policy.”67
With the emergence of a number of consumer publications in the mid
1990s, the state acted to “[educate] the masses about how to consume
cultural and commodity goods, and, above all, how to consume leisure
itself.”68 Augmented by the introduction of a forty-hour workweek, the
state’s leisure discourse promoted activities requiring capital expendi
ture in order to develop a culture of consumption that furthered
economic growth and affirmed the Party’s role as a competent
government. It was a culture that promoted “lifestyle shopping” and,
infused with the ideologies of patriotism and national humiliation,
became the source of the “modern construction of the spiritual civiliza
tion.”69
However, as the state has acted to maintain its hegemonic position
in post-1989 China, it has had to compete with trendier elements of
global commercial culture that tend to enjoy greater mass appeal. In
response, the state has tried to “modernize” its messages, using, in one
particular case, neon slogan boards, computer images, and ad displays in
Beijing to deliver the messages of a new “spiritual civilization” cam
paign.70 Influenced by the nearby success of “Kong-Tai” culture, the
66
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state sought to refashion itself through new corporate identities, “mod
ernized” journalism, and mainstream appeal.71
But, just as the Party tried to further its appeal through
commercial culture, commercial culture has manipulated state rhetoric
in order to make a profit. An insecticide, for example, was advertised
using language from a 1963 poem written by Mao, proclaiming, “Away
with all pests!”72 In a similar manner, a vacuum commercial remarked,
“dust won’t disappear of its own accord,” a clear reference to Mao’s
declaration that reactionaries would have to be swept away like dust.73
While it is not unusual for companies to employ official discourse
for their own profit, the reformulated rhetoric in China is profound in
that its use is fundamentally at odds with its ideological significance.
On one hand, this reinforces the strength of the Party as part of soci
ety’s collective consciousness, but it also makes state rhetoric subject to
the needs of individuals and diminishes its inherent meaning. While the
Party remains in a position of authority, the symbols of its hegemony
become malleable as the state, the market, and the individual construct
their own cultural niches.
CONCLUSION
China’s cultural development since 1989 has thus been underscored by
a complex interaction between the state, society, and the market. I have
argued that this relationship can be conceptualized as “a velvet prison
with Chinese characteristics.” The events of Tiananmen Square have
undoubtedly been significant in the construction of this velvet prison.
In the aftermath of June 4, the state—that is, the Chinese Communist
Party—acted quickly to reassert its claim to hegemony by utilizing the
discourse of patriotism and by reviving the rhetoric of national humilia
tion.
While the state has been reasonably successful in establishing and
maintaining its legitimacy, the ambiguous nature of its new hegemonic
71
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ideology, combined with the forces of economic reform, has allowed a
considerable degree of individual freedom that has ultimately under
mined the state’s ability to exercise a monopoly on the development of
culture. Hence, while the state tries to control the evolution of Chinese
culture from “the top,” individuals and economic forces simultaneously
affect the state, resulting in new relationships that redefine the role of
the state and the ways in which the populace understands its ideology.
Moreover, the success of the penetration of state ideology has been
a double-edged sword. While the diffusion of patriotic and national
humiliation based discourses have often been useful in developing a
pro-government mentality, groups and individuals have been able to use
official ideology to make demands of the state and challenge the
legitimacy of the state’s claims.
The CCP’s recent commitment to the development of a
“harmonious society” attests to the changing nature of state power.
Although “harmonious society” may imply a silencing of dissidence,
harmony is also a concept based upon the synthesis of different
elements. While this does not include “dissonant” elements, it does
represent a departure from previous generations that sought to impose a
monolithic cultural and economic order. In this regard, it seems that
China’s future will be marked by the continued interaction of “a live
network of lobbies” that further transform Chinese culture within the
framework of China’s velvet prison.
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